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The Yield Curve, Recessions, and the Credibility of the Monetary Regime:  
Long-run Evidence, 1875-1997 
By Michael D. Bordo and Joseph G. Haubrich 
 
This paper brings historical evidence to bear on the stylized fact that the yield curve predicts future 
growth. The spread between corporate bonds and commercial paper reliably predicts future growth over 
the period 1875-1997.  This predictability varies over time, however, particularly across different 
monetary regimes.  In accord with our proposed theory, regimes with low credibility (high persistence of 
inflation) tend to have better predictability.   
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 1. Introduction 
By now, the ability of the yield curve to predict recessions has reached the hallowed 
status of “stylized fact” among macroeconomists.  Wesley Mitchell, as early as 1913, 
noted different patterns in long and short interest rates.  Kessel (1965) more explicitly 
described how the term structure varied with the business cycle, and since then a variety 
of authors have looked at the ability of the term structure to predict future real activity.  
In the post -war U.S. economy, the term structure of interest rates has been a good 
predictor of future real activity.  Inversions (short rates higher than long rates) predict 
recessions (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991) and more generally, a steep yield curve 
predicts fast growth and a flat curve, slow growth(Harvey, 1988,1991, Haubrich and 
Dombrosky, 1995).  Dotsey (1998), Roma and Tourous (1997), Kozicki (1997), Stock 
and Watson (2001), and Hamilton and Kim (2002), among others, have further explored 
the predictive content of the yield curve.
1  The late 1990s appeared somewhat anomalous 
in that a relatively flat yield curve accompanied fast growth; however, an inversion did 
precede the recession that began in March of 2001.  
The evidence that supports this stylized fact comes from the post World War II 
experience of the United States, though an increasing amount of work has looked at other 
countries (Harvey 1991, Stock and Watson 2003, Gonzalez, Spencer, and Walz 2000).  
The predictive content of the yield curve for longer historical periods, however, has been 
curiously neglected.
2  Whether the yield curve’s ability to predict emerges as a general 
property of the American business cycle or depends sensitively on the structure of the 
economy, financial markets, and monetary policy seems an obvious question.  
Particularly since a subtext of the yield curve’s predictive ability has been the instability 
of its relationship with output growth, looking at a long time series seems warranted.  A 
broader historical perspective may also shed some light on the reasons behind the yield 
curve’s ability to predict future output—for example, one simply cannot ascribe twists in 
the yield curve during the 1880s to an FOMC ratcheting up short-term rates.  
                                                 
1 The literature is quite extensive, and Stock and Watson provide a useful survey, but some other papers  
we have found useful include Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), Chauvet and Potter (forthcoming), Dueker 
(1997), Friedman and Kuttner (1998), and Estrella and Mishkin (1998). 
2 Kessel (1965), of course, is a notable exception.  In this paper we attempt to answer this question by looking at the relationship 
between several measures of the term spread and movements in real economic activity.  
We focus on the United States for the period from 1875 to the present.  We examine this 
relationship using a consistent long series on both interest rate spreads and real activity at 
quarterly frequency.  
We then proceed to answer a second question which monetary theory suggests 
may be of importance: is there a systematic relationship between the monetary regime 
followed and the predictive ability of the spread?  Does having a regime based on a 
credible nominal anchor, such as a gold standard or an inflation target, matter for how 
well the yield curve predicts future growth? 
In section 2 we first analyze the pattern of spread and real GNP growth around 
reference cycle turning points.  We then run predictive regressions to capture any 
systematic relationship.  In section 3 we focus on the relationship between monetary 
regime and spreads by dividing the historical record into a number of episodes in which 
the price level and inflation rate follow behavior consistent with one of two regimes: a 
convertible or credible, low inflation regime and one of high inflation and lower 
credibility.  We corroborate this division by looking at several measures of inflation 
persistence across those periods.  We then ascertain the extent to which the relationship 
between GNP and the spread can be affected by persistence.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Empirical Discussion on Spreads 
 
Perhaps some reluctance in taking an historical perspective on the term structure lies with 
a concern about the data.  Certainly it is not the case that the standard spread between 10-
year Treasury bonds and three-month Treasury bills can just be extended back in time: T-
bills were not authorized by Congress until 1929, and the three-month maturity became a 
standard only in 1938 (Cook 1986).  Longer term government debt, because of its 
irregular issuance and its role as a backing for national banknotes, was not always 
representative of the debt markets (Homer 1977).  Measuring real output is perhaps even 
more difficult: national accounts were not invented until after the First World War, and 
despite attempts to extend them backwards, the results are not always consistent.   
  2In looking at such a long time period, data availability is the first concern, but 
consistency runs a close second.  Fortunately, however, long-run series designed to be 
consistent already exist over a fairly extensive period.  By updating the Balke and 
Gordon (1986) numbers we are able to construct quarterly series on output and interest 
rates from 1875 to 1997.  
For real output, we use the quarterly real GNP numbers from Balke and Gordon 
(1986) for the years 1875-1983.  Since the last years of this series are from the NIPA 
accounts, we continue the series until 1997Q2.  For our measure of the term spread, we 
again go to Balke and Gordon, using the difference between the yield on corporate bonds 
and the commercial paper rate.
3  The corporate bond series is extended using numbers 
from Moody’s (Balke and Gordon’s source) and the six-month commercial paper rate 
from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, until 1997:Q2, when this series ends.   
  By building on the Balke and Gordon data we have a series at least designed to be 
consistent.  Two differences with standard post Second World War data series need to be 
pointed out.  First, the aggregate output series we use is gross national product, not gross 
domestic product.  It includes the production by U.S. capital and labor overseas net of 
foreign capital and labor producing in the United States.  Second, the yields are between 
two risky securities of imprecisely defined maturity, not between two riskless 10-year 
and three-month Treasuries.  Our hope is that the differences in risk between the two 
securities do not dominate the term spread that arises from their maturities.   
  In table 1 we report the sample statistics for the data, and figure 1 plots the spread 
and GNP growth. 
 




















N  490 486 490 490  490  490 
Mean  676.46 3.4  5.05 6.84  1.79  -18.12 
Median  302.20 3.8  5.29 6.29  1.53  -19.20 
Range  2644.65 41.0  15.71 14.15  11.90  74.15 
S.D.   6.2 2.69  2.53  1.79  8.56 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the data used in predictive regression. 
 
                                                 
3 Appendix B, Table 2. 
  3One approach to the relationship between spreads and economic activity, based on work 
by Kessel (1965) and Dotsey (1998), is to look at the pattern of interest rates around 
business cycle peaks and troughs.  Figure 2 plots the spread around business cycle peaks, 
splitting the period into three panels to make any pattern more transparent.  Panel A plots 
cycles with peaks between 1875 and 1914, encompassing the pre-Federal Reserve days, 
panel B includes peaks between 1914 and 1953, and panel C includes the peaks after 
1953.  Kessel, who looked at business cycles between 1858 and 1961, finds a procyclical 
pattern, with short-term rates rising relative to long-term rates in expansions and falling 
in contractions; as the short rates often peak at the same time as the business cycle, this 
suggests predictability.  Dotsey looks directly at the spread, and when he considers the 
period after 1953, finds that inversions generally precede the peak (and thus the 
contraction) by several quarters.  We look at more business cycles (18 in all) and use a 
different spread, so the results differ somewhat.  Though the spread is often negative at a 
business cycle peak, it remains positive in many cases. 
For the post-Accord period, Dotsey finds his measure of the spread is negative at 
the business cycle peak in four of seven cases.  Our definition of the spread is negative in 
three of seven cases (three positive and one at zero).  For the period between the founding 
of the Fed and the Accord, of nine business cycles, our measure of the spread is negative 
only once.  The situation is different pre-Fed, however. Of the nine cycles, the spread is 
negative at eight of the nine business cycle peaks.  
Most of the recent work on the subject takes a more statistical approach, treating 
the spread as one variable in a regression designed to predict future output.  The 
regressions all take the general form of 
(1)  .  t t t Y L Spread Y ∆ + + = ∆ + ) ( 4 γ β α
Where  is the annual growth rate of real GNP (at a quarterly frequency), Spread is the 
spread between long-term and short-term bonds, and 
t Y ∆
) (L γ  is a lag polynomial, generally 
of length four (current and three lags).   
We take several different approaches to estimating equation (1).  The first two 
methods follow Stock and Watson (2001) and in fact use a slight modification of their 
computer code.  The first method uses in-sample prediction.  Equation (1) is estimated on 
the entire sample, and the parameters from that estimation are used in equation (1) to 
  4predict real GNP growth.  The predictive content of the term spread is evaluated first by 
using a Granger causality test, specifically by calculating the heteroskedasticity-
consistent F-test  that  0 = β .  It is also evaluated by examining the ratio of the mean 
squared error of predictions using the spread and using the lags of  t Y ∆ alone.  When we 
break the sample into sub-periods, we also test whether we have isolated a stable regime 
by using a QLR ( or sup-Wald) stability test. 
  The Stock and Watson program reports these statistics for predictions two, four, 
and eight periods ahead.  To avoid excessive data snooping (see Lo and MacKinlay 1990) 
we focus on the results for four quarters ahead, a traditional time frame for predictions 
involving the yield curve, although the results for the other prediction intervals are rarely 
materially different.  Table 2 reports these results.
4   
 
 
 Dates    Ratio 
MSE 
Granger QLR Index1  Index2   
 1876:1  1997:2  0.98  0.05  0.00  1910.4  1909:4   
  1876:1 1913:4 0.92  0.00  0.00  1906:3 1906:3   
  1914:1 1971:2 0.97  0.08  0.06  1946:2 1948:4   
  1914:1 1945:2 0.95  0.06  0.00  1940:4 1940:2   
  1946:1 1971:2 0.92  0.03  0.02  1965:3 1965:3   
 1951:1  1964:4  0.77  0.00  0.00  1953.3  1961:4   
  1971:3 1997:2 0.59  0.00  0.00  1991:4 1991:1   
 1971:3  1984:4  0.44  0.00  0.00  1973.2  1980.4   
 1985:1  1997.2  0.89  0.13  0.00  1994:4  1994:1   
             
Table 2: In-sample prediction results, using the spread, four quarters ahead, reporting 
the ratio of the Mean Squared Errors, the Granger causality test , the probability that the 
coefficient on Rspread is zero,  QLR’s Pvalue for the constant and spread, and the index 
of the maximum value of the  QLR statistic. 
 
Notice several things in Table 2.  First, the term structure adds predictive power: in every 
case, for every sub-period, the ratio of the MSE with the spread to the MSE without the 
spread is less than one, often by a large amount.  The spread does particularly well for the 
two periods after the breakdown of Bretton Woods (1971).  This is confirmed by the 
                                                 
4 We use a different dating convention than do Stock and Watson.  For them, the first quarter of a year is 
digitized as zero, while we use .25, so their 1925.00 translates into our 1925.25, and their 1925.75 becomes 
our 1926.00.  Also note these dates are for the period run, so it includes the lags used and the extra quarter 
used to get growth rates.  This means that the first period the regression can start in is1876:1, because the 
data start in 1875:1. 
  5Granger causality test, which is significant at the 10 percent level in every case but the 
1985-1997 period, and in many cases highly significant.  Often, however, the QLR 
statistic is significant, suggesting coefficients are not fully stable over the sub-periods, 
though the exact form of the statistic picks out different break dates.  Note also that 
despite several suggestions that the spread has become less accurate as a predictor since 
1985, we find evidence that it still does well, although this sub-period has the least 
significant Granger causality statistic.  Finally, though not reported in the table, small 
variations in the timing of the sub-samples do not matter materially for the results.   
  The next set of tests, termed “simulated out of sample” by Stock and Watson, 
estimates the regression with data only up to date t.  Notice that we do not say “available 
at date t” because, strictly speaking, these GNP numbers were created well after the time 
they purportedly measure.  The interest rate numbers would have been available, 
however.  Also notice that the sample size grows over time.   
  As with the in-sample case, we use the spread and the contemporaneous value of 
RGNP growth (log difference real GNP) and three of its lags.  We continue to 
concentrate on a forecast horizon of one year (four quarters).  Predictive ability is 
measured by the mean squared error of the forecasts with and without the term spread.   
 




1875:1 1997:2  0.004003 0.004159 1.038937
1875:1 1913:4  0.003769 0.003437 0.912104
1914:1 1971:2  0.005832 0.006629 1.136623
1914:1 1945:2  0.010547 0.011903 1.128518
1946:1 1971:2  0.000785 0.000879 1.11973
1951:1 1964:4  0.00103 0.000804 0.77958
1971:3 1997:2  0.000553 0.000415 0.75008
1971:3 1984:4  0.001111 0.000591 0.531985
1985:1 1997:2  0.000265 0.000275 1.035944
Table 3: Out-of-Sample prediction results.   
 
  6In the out –of-sample results reported in table 3, the spread does a less impressive 
a job in improving on the predictive ability of the univariate regression.  In only three of 
the nine sub-periods does the spread improve the MSE of the forecast.  Significantly, 
those are the periods that did best in the in-sample tests of table 3: the sub-period before 
the Federal Reserve, and the two post-Bretton-Woods periods, particularly the first one.   
  Judging the ability of the yield spread to predict by looking at the ratio of the 
mean squared errors brings up a potential problem, however.  Our extensive use of the 
mean squared error as a comparison statistic naturally brings up the distribution of that 
statistic.  When does the difference between two mean squared errors really mean 
something?  When is it due to something more than chance?  While test statistics have 
been developed by West (1996) and Clark and McCracken (2001), the small-sample 
properties of nested hypotheses are not well understood at this point.  For this reason, 
Stock and Watson do not report tests of forecast equality.  While Monte Carlo simulation 
would not be practical for Stock and Watson given the number of countries and different 
time series they examine, in our case, the smaller number of series involved makes 
simulation more practical.  Accordingly, we generate simulated distributions of the 
relative mean squared error under two conditions.   
In the first case, we generate 2000 random samples of length 400 for real GNP 
and the spread.  Real GNP is generated from equation (1) with only one lag of RGNP 
using the sample means and variances for real GNP and the spread, and using coefficients 
from the estimated version of equation (1).  We then regress this artificial RGNP number 
against its lags and the artificial spread, and again against just its own lags.  The ratio of 
the mean squared errors is computed and stored.  Since the model assumes a role for the 
spread, this exercise provides a notion of “power”—how well the ratio of MSE can pick 
out a real difference when it is really there.  The top panel of figure 3 plots a histogram of 
this distribution.  
In the second case, we set  0 = β  and again generate 2000 samples of length 400, 
again computing the ratio of MSE with and without the spread.  Since this set of artificial 
data is constructed so that the spread does not matter, this exercise provides a measure of 
  7“size,” or how often the ratio suggests that the spread matters when in fact it does not.  
The bottom panel of figure 3 plots the histogram of this distribution.
5   
In comparing the two distributions, notice that less than one percent of the false 
positives fall below 0.98—suggesting that a ratio of MSE at or below that number is 
unlikely to result from chance alone.  In another case, checking the size for a series of 
length 150, scaled to match statistics of the 1875-1913 period, it is again the case that few 
MSE ratios by chance fall below 0.98, suggesting the significance of the MSE ratio for 
that time period. 
Another approach, suggested by Cecchetti (1995), is to look at rolling regressions.  
This is an attempt to get around the problem that the longer out-of-sample regressions 
based on equation (1) assume constant coefficients.  We compare the results for different 
prediction windows, using a base case of 24 quarters (six years).  Table 4 reports the 
results. 
 
Window  MSE with spread  MSE, lags GNP  ratio 
12  0.0005028 0.0006237 0.806 
24  0.0006933 0.0008357 0.830 
48  0.0008250 0.0008495 0.971 
60  0.0008854 0.0008888 0.996 
100  0.0010208 0.001029  0.9913 
Table 4: Mean squared errors for out-of-sample predictions using rolling regressions. 
 
For each case in table 4, using the spread allows for better prediction of future real 
GNP growth. The mean squared error is particularly lower for the shorter windows of 
three and six years. 
The MSE using a rolling regression can handle the problem of shifting 
coefficients, but it does not tell us how those coefficients change over time or regimes.  
Figures 4 and 5 plot the coefficient of the spread in the regressions and also the t-statistic 
on the spread for the window of 24 quarters.  The effect of the spread shifts dramatically 
over time, reaching both positive and negative values.  The shift is particularly abrupt in 
                                                 
5 The simulations were run on a Dell Optiplex GX1 using the commands rndn (for the RGNP shock) and 
  8the years near the end of the Second World War.  The t-statistic generally shows 
significance, particularly in later years. 
Table 5 takes another approach.  It shows the mean squared error of the 
predictions across different regimes.  A comparison with table 3 is quite interesting.  
Overall, the spread appears to better advantage in the rolling regressions.  For all but one 
subperiod, using the spread helps, although with a six-year window, the results for the 
shorter subperiods should be treated with caution.  The pre-Fed period no longer stands 
out as a good time for the spread.  The post-Accord period looks good, as does the post-
Bretton Woods period.  Once again, however, the years after 1985—the so-called 
“maestro” years--show the spread is less able to predict. 
 
Start  end  Univariate MSE  Spread  
MSE 
Ratio 
1875:1 1997:2 0.000836  0.000693  0.830 
1875:1 1913:4 0.000892  0.000843  0.945 
1914:1 1971:2 0.001300  0.001039  0.800 
1914:1 1945:2 0.001945  0.001659  0.853 
1946:1 1971:2 0.000347  0.000323  0.933 
1951:1 1964:4 0.000529  0.000461  0.871 
1971:3 1997:2 0.000220  0.000170  0.772 
1971:3 1984:4 0.000692  0.000536  0.775 
1985:1 1997:2 0.000328  0.000333  1.012 
Table 5: Rolling regression (out-of-sample) prediction results, 24-period (6-year) 
window.   
 
One concern already alluded to earlier potentially makes these results less compelling: 
questions about the data.  Chief among these are the interpolation of the GNP numbers, 
anomalies at the end of World War II, and the quality of the commercial paper yields.  
Adjusting our work to address these concerns actually highlights the robustness of the 
yield curve’s predictive content. 
                                                                                                                                                 
rndu (for the spread) in GAUSS for Windows NT/95 Version 3.2.32. 
  9  Using the original annual data (again from Balke and Gordon), the predictive 
ability of the yield curve increases noticeably, at least as measured by the ratio of the 
mean squared error.  For example, over the entire 1875-1996 period, the ratio of MSE 
(for rolling regressions with a six year lag) is 0.32 for annual data, compared with 0.80 
for quarterly data.  The ratio of MSE is uniformly lower using annual data, and except for 
the 1951-1962 period, much better.   
  Reapportioning the high growth years at the end of the Second World War 
between the war and post-war regimes creates a modest difference.  Starting the post-war 
period in 1947 instead of 1946 shifts the ratio of MSE from 0.933 to 0.939, and a 1948 
start gives a ratio of 0.924.  There is a somewhat larger effect on the war years (a shorter 
sample), as extending them to the end of 1947 reduces the ratio of MSE from 0.853 to 
0.749, and extending them through 1947 yields 0.752.  Note in all cases that the yield 
curve continues to show predictive power. 
  One may also be concerned about using commercial paper yields as a measure of 
short-term interest rates, particularly because of the low volumes in this market between 
the Great Depression and the end of the Second World War.  We feel this concern is 
exaggerated, not only because the commercial rate has been a workhorse for historical 
interest rate studies (see, for example, Zarnowitz 1992), but also because the strong 
positive results we obtain strongly argue against excessive noise in the data.  As a further 
check, however, we replaced the commercial paper rate with the call money rate (from 
MacAulay 1938) for the available years, 1875-1936.  The results remained quite similar.  
The ratio of MSE for rolling regressions falls from .830 (using commercial paper) to .817 
for the entire sample period, increases from 0.945 to 0.958 for the pre-Fed period, and 
falls from 0.800 to 0.795 in the 1914-1971 period.  Notice the yield curve continues to 
help predict output, and that the relative ranking of the predictability across time periods 
remains the same.  
Overall, then, the term spread we use has predictive power for future real GNP 
growth, and often does better than using just the lags of GNP itself.  Although there is 
good evidence that the yield spread “works” in some sense over the entire sample, there 
are two periods when it does particularly well.  The first is in the pre-Fed gold standard 
days, 1875-1913, and the second is in post-Bretton Woods period, especially between 
  101971 and 1984.  Note that these results may not match up exactly with the literature, 
which uses a different yield spread (Treasuries), an option not available to us because we 
want a consistent series.  Previous work has, however, suggested that the predictive 
ability of the term structure may have broken down in the more recent period (Haubrich 
and Dombrosky 1996; Stock and Watson 2001). 
This then establishes the first part of the hypothesis: The yield curve has 
significant predictive power for future economic growth, and this relationship seems to 
have prevailed for the past 125 years.  Furthermore, our use of regressions suggests that 
this predictive power is not only about direction; a steeper yield curve not only signals an 
expansion, but it also heralds stronger growth. 
 
3. Monetary Regimes and Predictability 
 
The yield curve’s ability to predict, robust as it is, does not appear to be constant over 
time.  This leads to the second area we explore in this paper: the extent to which that 
predictive ability relates to the monetary regime in place.  In this section we sketch out 
the attributes of some key idealized regimes, discuss the salient features of different 
regimes since 1875, and examine the evidence for the effect of the regime on the yield 
curve. 
A succinct way to define a monetary regime is “as a set of monetary arrangements 
and institutions accompanied by a set of expectations—expectations by the public with 
respect to policymakers’ actions and expectations by policymakers about the public’s 
reaction” (Bordo and Schwartz 1999, p. 152).  It’s perhaps most useful to consider some 
idealized regimes first. 
  Consider a gold standard regime and a fiat regime with a stable price level.  In 
both regimes, either because of the commitment to gold or the commitment to a stable 
price level, long-run expectations of inflation are zero: The price level in 20 years is 
expected to be the same as it is today.  Two sorts of shocks might hit these economies: 
real or inflationary.   
  Inflation, when it occurs, will be temporary.  Under a gold standard regime, a big 
gold discovery might flood the country with gold, increasing its money supply and thus 
  11prices, until the specie-flow mechanism distributed the gold to the rest of the world. (In 
the longer run, the shift in the relative price of gold will shift the gold to non-monetary 
uses and eventually reduce even the world’s monetary gold stock.  See Barro (1979)  
Because the inflation is known to be temporary, it will have different impacts on short-
term and long-term interest rates.
6   
Short term rates will rise.  They will rise because inflation expectations rise above 
zero, as the inflation, though temporary, persists for a few periods (e.g., at least several 
quarters).  One caveat is important here.  The initial reaction of short-term rates may well 
be negative, as the liquidity effect drives rates down (for example, if the central bank 
lowers its policy rate).  The liquidity effect will die out, however, leaving the expected 
inflation effect to dominate.  Under a credible fiat regime, an inflation shock may occur 
for any number or reasons, such as a response to unemployment or an imperfect forecast 
of money demand.    
  A temporary bout of inflation will have no effect on long-term rates; without a 
real effect, it will not shift real rates, and being temporary, it will have minimal impact on 
inflation expectations for the long haul.  The absence of a long-term effect holds true in 
either regime.  Implicitly this result relies on treating the nominal term structure as 
determined by the simple expectations hypothesis plus the Fisher equation.  
  Putting these together for the term structure, under a gold standard or a credible 
fiat regime, an inflationary shock will leave long rates alone but increase short rates, 
flattening the yield curve, potentially leading to an inversion.  Thus, while the liquidity 
effect might lead to a steeper yield curve on occasion, an inflationary shock will 
eventually lead to a flatter curve.   
  A real shock also has a differential impact on short and long rates.  If the real 
shock is temporary, say a harvest failure, railroad strike, or oil crisis, short rates will rise, 
as people attempt to smooth consumption by borrowing from the future.  Because the 
shock is temporary, short rates will soon return to normal.  As a consequence, the impact 
on long-term rates will be small, again as implied by the expectations hypothesis.  The 
net result is that a real shock will flatten the yield curve, potentially leading to inversion. 
                                                 
6 This abstracts from wars and other shocks which lead to suspension of convertibility. 
  12  The two idealized regimes thus share another feature.  Both real and inflationary 
shocks tend to move the term structure in the same way; increasing short rates while 
leaving long rates unchanged.  Looking just at the term structure, then, it would be 
difficult to predict future real activity, as an inversion could be caused by either real or 
inflationary shocks.  The yield curve would be a rather noisy signal. 
  Now consider a third idealized regime, a fiat money standard without credibility, 
where inflation is a random walk (that is, very persistent).  Far from expecting price level 
increases to be reversed, the public expects the higher inflation rate to continue forever 
(see Evans and Wachtel 1993).  Again consider what happens to the term structure under 
both a real and an inflationary shock.   
  An inflation shock will increase short rates, just as before.  Long rates will also 
increase, as expectations of inflation are permanently higher, and so expectations of all 
future short rates are moved up by this amount.  An inflation shock thus has minimal 
effect on the term structure, as both long and short rates move up by the amount of the 
permanently higher inflation rate.  In other words, the inflation shock is neutral with 
respect to the slope of the term structure.  This result rests on two additional assumptions 
that need to be made clear.  First, inflation is not expected to be so high and variable as to 
destroy the long-term bond market; inflation remains somewhat moderate.  Secondly, an 
inflation shock does not itself signal a shift in the process for inflation that materially 
changes either the variance or the persistence of inflation.  For example, the shock will 
not be neutral with respect to the slope if it indicates a shift to increasing inflation. 
  A real shock, by contrast, will increase short rates (think of the central bank 
contracting the money supply), but, as it is temporary, long rates will not increase. In this 
case, the term  structure gets flatter, tending to inversion.  Consequently, in a regime with 
persistent inflation, yield curve inversions signal downturns.  Since inflationary shocks 
do not create inversions, they do not add noise.  
  Put another way, albeit still somewhat informally, using the Fisher equation, 
which explains nominal rates as the sum of real rates and expected inflation, we find that 
for periods i we have  2 , 1 =
  13(2) Ri=ri+πi
e 
where Ri is the nominal interest rate in period i, ri   is the real rate, and πi
e  is the expected 
inflation rate in period i.  The simple expectations theory of the term structure then 
implies that the long rate is 
(3) RL=(R1+R2)/2. 
Substituting (2) into (3) implies that the long-short spread, RL-R1 is just 
(4) RL-R1= 
2 2
1 2 1 2
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where  u is the marginal utility in period s, E is the expectations operator, and Π  is 
the gross inflation rate from t to t+s.  
) ( ' s c s t+
  In either case, however, the effect of regime credibility on the yield curve is 
substantially the same.  Thus, in a very credible regime of price level targeting, high 
inflation today means that expected inflation should be negative, as prices must drop to 
keep the price level at its target.  After the target is reached, no more inflation is 
expected; a natural way to interpret this result is that high   implies    .  
High inflation today would steepen the yield curve by dropping short rates.   
0 π , 0 1 <
e π 0 2 =
e π
  In a credible regime with a zero inflation target, rather than a price level target, 
the price increase is not taken back, so inflation is always expected to be zero.  Thus, 
whatever inflation is today,  , and today’s inflation has no impact on the yield 
curve.  We suspect, however, that few regimes have such a strong response to inflation at 
the time horizon of short maturities, e.g., three months.  Consequently, it makes more 
sense to assume some additional short-term persistence in inflation, so that high inflation 
today implies high inflation in the near term, but no expected inflation in the long term.  
This results in   and  , implying that inflation today flattens the yield curve.   
0 2 1 = =
e e π π
0 2 =
e π 0 1 >
e π
  14  For a non-credible regime, where inflation is a random walk, today’s inflation rate 
is the best guess of future inflation rates, so  .  Inflation shifts the yield curve 
up in a parallel fashion, keeping the spread unchanged.   
0 2 1 π π π = =
e e
  
3.1. Historical Regimes   
 
As the reader might have guessed, the regimes discussed so far, though idealized, are not 
purely hypothetical.  The gold standard regime corresponds to the United States from 
1879 to 1897, a time of generally declining prices.  The random-walk inflation regime 
corresponds to the United States in 1963-1990, a time of generally high and persistent 
inflation.  The 1920s are an example of a somewhat impure gold standard regime, with 
the Federal Reserve operating.  The 1950s (post-Accord), a time of low inflation, are 
perhaps the closest example to a fiat regime with a stable price level, a regime perhaps 
once again entered in the late 1990s. 
  The analysis of section 2 provides some broad predictions about how well the 
yield curve should predict real activity in each of these periods.  It ought to do well in the 
post-war period, but relatively poorly in the 1800s, 1920s, and 1950s. 
  One possible problem in comparing regimes lies with the advent of the Federal 
Reserve in 1914.  Federal Reserve smoothing of short-term interest rates at a seasonal 
frequency (Mankiw, Miron, and Weil 1987), means that some real and inflationary 
shocks will not show up directly in short-term rates.  This will most directly affect 
comparisons between the 1800s and later periods, because the 1920s, 1950s and 1960-
1970s all fall into the post-Fed period.  To the extent that the Fed was offsetting shocks, 
however, the smoothing may change the frequency of shocks observed, but some whould 
still be observable.  Inflationary shocks caused by the financing of crop movements may 
disappear after 1914, but shocks from gold discoveries would still remain.  What the 
difference would mean, economically and econometrically, remains an open question.      
  Looking at specific periods also holds the promise of being able to disentangle 
real and inflationary shocks—looking at specific episodes of oil shocks, harvest failures, 
gold discoveries, and the like.  While this paper does not pursue it, such an approach 
  15might allow further confirmation or rejection of the story in Section 2, if inflationary 
noise or real shocks can be identified and correlated with the term structure.   
Table 6 provides the dates of the different regimes and data on inflation, real GNP 
growth, term spread and inflation persistence. 
 




TOTAL  1875:1-1997:2  2.27% 3.44% 1.79%  -18.12 
 Commodity 1875:1-1913:4  -0.07  4.04  0.35  -20.82 
 Transition  1914:1-1971:2  2.76 3.21 2.26  -17.95 
       New Fed         1914:1-
1920:4 
11.23 0.047 1.65 -19.85 
       Roaring 20s         1921:1-
1929:2 
-1.31 6.48  1.81 -19.12 
        Depression         1929:3-
1941:4 
-0.45 2.28  4.68 -18.28 
        World Wars      1914:1-1945:2  2.11  3.51  2.98  -18.79 
 Bretton  Woods  1946:1-1971:2  3.33 3.71 1.36  -16.94 
         Post-Accord       1951:1-1964:4  1.72  3.60  1.35  -19.59 
         Vietnam       1965:1-1971:2  4.79  4.48  1.23  -18.06 
  Fiat  1971:3-1997:2  5.82 3.94 2.53  -15.26 
          Great inflation        1971:3-1984:4  8.77  4.82  1.95  -13.24 
          Maestro        1985:1-1997:2  2.75  3.01  3.44  -18.46 
Table 6: Dates, inflation, real growth, spread, and inflation persistence for difference 
regimes. RGNP growth and spread are from our updates of Gordon and Balke.  Inflation 
is from Benati, his update of Gordon and Balke.  Inflation persistence is calculated by 
Benati, one-sided log spectral density at zero. Persistence data begins in 1876:Q2. 
 
The Gold Standard  1879-1914 
 
The United States was on a specie standard from 1879 to 1914.  It was de jure 
bimetallic but de facto gold.  After the Civil War, the U.S. was still on the greenback 
paper money standard (greenbacks were inconvertible paper dollars issued to help 
  16finance the war), but by 1879 convertibility had been reestablished.  The standard that 
was restored, however, was gold because silver, the undervalued currency under the 
bimetallic standard established by the Constitution in 1789, had been driven out of the 
U.S. by the mid-1850s and the Coinage Act of 1873 (“the Crime of ‘73”) had 
demonetized the standard silver coin.  The U.S., like other countries on the gold standard, 
followed the key rule of maintaining a fixed price of domestic currency in terms of gold 
(Bordo and Kydland 1995).  The U.S. Treasury acted as the monetary authority, freely 
buying and selling gold on demand, since the country did not have a formal central bank. 
By fixing the price of gold in terms of dollars, gold served as the nominal anchor for the 
price level.  
  Under the gold standard price level movements would tend to be mean reverting; 
price level movements would eventually be reversed.  This property derived from the fact 
that gold was a form of commodity money, and under a commodity money standard, 
market forces in the long run determined the price level.  According to the classical 
theory of the gold standard (Barro 1979; Bordo 1984), while the monetary authority sets 
the nominal price of gold, the real price is determined by the demand and supply of 
monetary gold.  Shocks to the demand or supply of gold would affect the relative price of 
gold and hence given the nominal price, the price level.  These shocks are offset by two 
sets of forces: changes in production arising in response to the real price shock, and 
substitution between monetary and non-monetary uses of gold.  The operation of these 
forces causes the price level to revert to some long-run mean level.  Indeed, the pattern of 
wholesale prices in the U.S., as well as the U.K. displays  a wavelike motion reflecting 
alternate phases of rising and declining price levels in accord with this theory (Bordo 
1981). 
  The automatic price stabilizing property of the gold standard determined the price 
level for the entire gold standard world; it could be treated as a closed system.  The gold 
standard also had an automatic international adjustment mechanism, called the price 
specie flow mechanism, which harmonized price levels across countries.  The 
mechanism, in theory, allowed gold flows and international capital flows to finance 
current account imbalances without involving monetary authorities directly. In practice, 
however, central banks often violated the “rules of the game,” which prescribed that 
  17monetary policy should only speed up the automatic adjustment mechanism, by engaging 
in sterilization policies as well as limited countercyclical demand management (Bordo 
and MacDonald 1997). 
   The 1879-1914 period is neatly split into two episodes of declining and then 
rising prices of approximately 16 years.  The first, from 1879 to 1897,  exhibited fairly 
mild deflation of 1.2 percent (annual rate GNP deflator figures, Q4 over Q4 price level 
change).  This deflation was a worldwide phenomenon which resulted from excess 
demand for monetary gold that had arisen from two sources.  First, a number of important 
countries left bimetallic and silver standards and joined the gold standard.  Second, real 
incomes worldwide had grown.  The episode was punctuated by several recessions of 
increasing severity. 
The subsequent episode, 1897-1914, was one of mild inflation with price levels 
rising by 0.9 percent on average and rapid growth of 3.5 percent.  It was punctuated by 
several recessions, the most notable in 1907-08.  The inflation reflected the consequences 
of massive gold discoveries in South Africa and Alaska which doubled the world’s 
monetary gold stock.  Many argue that these discoveries were no accident, that the rising 
real price of gold in the previous two decades had stimulated an intensive search for new 
sources of gold and new technologies to improve the output of existing mines. 
 
The Interwar Period, 1919-1941 
 
  World War I was a period of high inflation in the U.S. (25 percent per year from 
1914 to 1919) but the U.S. did not leave the gold standard (except for an embargo on 
gold exports in 1917-1919) as did the other countries fighting the war.  The inflation 
reflected massive gold imports from the European belligerents buying war materiel as 
well as inflationary finance once the United States entered the war.  The war was 
followed by a further bout of commodity inflation, which ended with a severe deflation 
and depression from 1919 to 1921.  This episode is attributed to tight central bank 
policies around the world as policymakers attempted to restore the prewar gold standard. 
  The 1920s were a decade of near price stability (prices declined by less than 1 
percent per annum), accompanied by very rapid growth with two mild cycles.  The U.S. 
  18in this period still adhered to the gold standard but its automatic international adjustment 
mechanism was greatly tempered by Federal Reserve countercyclical policies and gold 
sterilization.  The decade ended with the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great 
Contraction of 1929-1933.  The consensus view attributes its severity to the Federal 
Reserve’s failure to offset the monetary collapse triggered by several waves of banking 
panics (Friedman and Schwartz 1963).  It also was transmitted abroad by many countries 
continued adherence to the gold standard.  
  The contraction ended in the spring of 1933 following the banking holiday in 
March, a cutting of the link with the gold standard in April and a reflationary Treasury 
gold and silver purchase program.  The U.S. went back to the gold standard at a devalued 
parity in 1935 but the gold standard after this point was even more managed than in the 
1920s.  
 
Post-World War II: Bretton Woods 
 
World War II, like World War I, was a period of high inflation, although a smaller 
fraction of war expenditure was money financed. After the war, the U.S. and many other 
countries joined a new international monetary system, the Bretton Woods system.  It 
involved a much less direct link to gold as a nominal anchor than had existed during 
either the interwar or prewar gold standards.  Under Bretton Woods, the U.S. served as 
the center country, pegging the dollar at the 1934 parity of $35.00, with the Treasury 
committed to buying and selling gold freely.  Other countries would peg their currencies 
to gold and then intervene to maintain the peg.  The system was an adjustable peg. 
Members could alter their parities in the face of a fundamental disequilbrium which 
systematically over- or undervalued their real exchange rates (Bordo 1993).
7 
  The Bretton Woods system, once current account convertibility was restored by 
1959, operated fairly successfully in fostering world trade for less than a decade.  It also 
was associated with relatively low inflation from the early 1950s to the mid 1960s in the 
                                                 
7 Other aspects of the Bretton Woods system included current account convertibility with capital controls 
encouraged, the use of domestic monetary and fiscal policies to offset domestic aggregate demand shocks 
independent of the balance of payments, and the use of IMF credits to finance short term balance of 
payments disequilibria. 
  19U.S. as well as other countries.  It is highly possible that the golden nominal anchor 
served to restrain US policy-makers, in part echoing the earlier gold-based regimes. 
  But the Bretton Woods regime was short lived.  It began collapsing in 1968 as a 
result of underlying flaws in its design (Bordo 1993, Garber 1993), inappropriate policies 
followed by its members, evasion of capital controls, and, above all, the abandonment by 
the center country of its responsibility to maintain price stability.  The United States 
began following expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to finance social programs 
and the Vietnam War.  The link with gold was severed in 1971 when President Nixon 
closed the gold window.  Thus the golden anchor, which had been stretched since 1914, 
was finally abandoned in 1971 (Redish 1996). 
 
The Fiat Money Regime 
 
  The breakdown of Bretton Woods was followed by more than a decade of high 
inflation.  The advanced countries shifted to a regime of managed floating and fiat 
money. Inflation and rapid money growth in the 1970s reflected attempts to play the 
Phillips curve tradeoff, the accommodation of oil price shocks, and the use of 
inappropriate policy models and indicators (Bordo and Schwartz 1997; Calomiris and 
Wheelock 1998). Evidence of a regime shift after Bretton Woods is observed in 
increasing inflation persistence and other attributes of the time series properties of 
inflation (see table 8 below and Bordo and Schwartz 1997). 
  In reaction to the distortions associated with high inflation, major policy reversals 
occurred in the U.S. and other countries in 1979.  In the U.S., the Volcker shock of 1979 
involved a shift in Federal Reserve operating procedures away from a focus on interest 
rates and towards aggregates.  The shift led to a massive monetary contraction, a spike in 
interest rates of all maturities, and a severe recession from 1979 to 1982.  The policy 
reversal succeeded after a few years in reducing the core rate of inflation to under 5 
percent.  Since then, the continued pursuit of low inflation in the U.S. and other advanced 
countries, the announcement of explicit inflation targets in the UK, Canada and Sweden, 
(although not the U.S.), and the adoption of independent central banks by many 
countries, all point in the direction of another regime change.  This latest regime change, 
  20back towards a commitment to low inflation, in many ways echoes the convertibility 
principle of the old gold standard. 
 
3.2 Inflation Persistence  
 
The above discussion suggests a way to measure the performance and credibility of 
regimes.  Since under the gold standard inflation was temporary, and quickly brought 
under control by the price-specie flow mechanism, while the post-Bretton Woods era saw 
inflation stay high for extended periods, the persistence of inflation appears as a key 
factor in regimes.  Are high levels of inflation followed by more high levels, or does the 
rate quickly revert to lower levels?  In credible regimes, such as the gold standard, 
inflation shows little persistence.  Less credible regimes, such as the post-Bretton Woods 
years show more persistence.  Persistence can provide a quantitative way to distinguish 
policy regimes and assess how the predictive content of the yield differs across them.  
However, the level of persistence and how it has changed over time and over 
regimes, has been the subject of much dispute.  Cogley and Sargent (2001), applying 
Bayesian techniques to a vector autoregression with random coefficient find that 
persistence changes over time, with low persistence before the 1960s, high persistence in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, and reduced persistence in recent years.  This is consistent 
with their finding that high persistence correlates positively with the level of inflation.   
Stock (2001) has disagreed with these results, arguing that inflation persistence 
has been effectively constant over the post-war period, showing no correlation between 
levels and persistence.  Stock uses a different estimation approach, looking at the largest 
root of an autoregressive representation of inflation.  He further aruges that the Cogley 
and Sargent techniques confuse changes in persistence and changes in variance.  Their 
measure of persistence is related to the height of the spectrum at zero frequency.  
Consequently, a process with a low spectrum overall (low variance) may look less 
persistent than a process with a high spectrum.    
Benati (forthcoming) directly addresses Stock’s concerns: Using a random 
coefficients autoregressive process for inflation, Benati adjusts for the variance of 
inflation and thus is able to disentangle persistence and variance.  Of equal value to us, he 
  21uses inflation from the Balke-Gordon source, giving us a measure of persistence that 
accords nicely with our other data.  Cogley and Sargent (2003) also account for variance, 
by using the normalized spectrum, and like Benati find that persistence does change over 
time.  
 Benati reports four measures of persistence: one- and two-sided estimates of the 
log spectral density at zero, and one- and two-sided sums of autorgressive coefficients.  
While Benati appears to somewhat prefer the two-sided spectral measure, we prefer the 
one-sided, as it does not bring in future information that may contaminate predictions.  
Empirically, however, it makes little difference.   
 
3.3 Effect of Persistence on Predictability  
 
  As discussed above, our examination of regimes leads us to predict that the yield 
curve will predict better in less credible regimes.  There, nominal shocks increase both 
short and long interest rates, leaving the spread between them relatively unaffected.  In 
the more credible regimes, nominal shocks move short rates but not long rates, adding 
noise to the signal coming from the real yield spread.  Thus a key factor in the predictive 
content of the yield curve should be the persistence of inflation.  
  First, though, it makes sense to take a closer look at the relationship between 
persistence and the yield spread itself.  The high serial correlation (at a quarterly 
frequency) in both the spread and persistence measures makes a simple correlation 
unreliable.  To correct for this we run regressions of the spread against all four of 
Benati’s measures of persistence, using Newey-West standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  Table 7 reports these results. 
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(3.58) 
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(7.27) 
 
           
Table 7: Regression of spread against Benati persistence measures, t-stats in parenthesis 
based on Newey-West corrected standard errors with four lags. 
 
An increase in persistence goes along with a steeper yield curve, on average.  For positive 
inflation rates (which predominate in the sample) this accords with the theory of section 
3; with little persistence, a high inflation shock increases the nominal interest rate today 
but leaves long rates unchanged, leading to an inversion.  With higher persistence, both 
long and short nominal rates increase.   
A first approach to understanding the effect of inflation persistence on the 
predictive ability of the yield curve is to make a comparison across regimes.  Using the 
ratios of MSE in table 5 and the inflation persistence estimates in table 6, we compute a 
simple correlation between a regime’s inflation persistence and the term structure’s 
predictive ability.  This yields a correlation of –0.60, which has a t-value of 1.97, for a 
probability of 0.089.  A Spearman rank correlation yields –0.68, with a t of 2.48 and 
probability value of 0.04, though the t is not a good approximation for the 7 degrees of 
freedom in our sample.  There are similar (somewhat stronger) results if we use the 
predictive content measures of table 3 (out of sample, not rolling).  This seems mainly, 
but not exclusively, driven by the post-Bretton Woods and great inflation regimes, which 
have both very persistent inflation and very good predictive content.  Thus, there is at 
least marginal evidence that more persistent inflation (higher values of the measure) 
correlate with better predictive ability (lower MSE ratio). 
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Start End  Persistence  MSE  ratio, 
rolling 
MSE Ratio, 
out of sample 
MSE ratio, 
in-sample 
1875:1 1997:2  -18.12  0.830 1.038937  0.98 
1875:1 1913:4  -20.82  0.945 0.912104  0.92 
1914:1 1971:2  -17.95  0.800 1.136623  0.97 
1914:1 1945:2  -18.79  0.853 1.128518  0.95 
1946:1 1971:2  -19.59  0.933 1.11973  0.92 
1951:1 1964:4  -16.94  0.871 0.77958  0.77 
1971:3 1997:2  -15.26  0.772 0.75008  0.59 
1971:3 1984:4  -13.24  0.775 0.531985  0.44 










Table 8: Correlation of predictive ratios with persistence. t values in parenthesis. 
 
This correlation is robust to the concerns voiced in section 2 about the uniformity of the 
data series (annual versus quarterly data, anomalies the end of the World War II, and 
commercial paper versus call money yields).  Thus, using annual data, the correlation of the 
predictive ratio with persistence for the rolling regressions remains negative, at –0.44, though 
the t-statistic is lower, at 1.3.  Shifting the endpoint of World War II actually improves the 
results, as those years also show very high inflation persistence, and so the correlation both 
gets more negative (to –0.66) and the t-statistic increases (to 2.38).  Using call money rates, 
the correlation comes in at –0.62, with a t-statistic of 2.65.  The general relationship thus 
appears  to hold even in these alternative empirical specifications. 
A somewhat different approach to uncovering the effect of persistence on 
predictability would be to correlate the two at a quarterly frequency.  At least initially, this 
gives a more continuous variable than shifts in regime, and does not require assuming 
particular dates for regime changes.  The difficulty is that there is no natural measure for 
predictability quarter-by-quarter.  Figure 6 shows one attempt, plotting the difference in 
the absolute value of the prediction errors between a regression that uses only lagged 
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quite noisy, and though it consistently shows a negative relationship between persistence 
and predictability, the coefficient is never statistically significant.   
  
4. Conclusions: Lessons from History for Policy. 
 
  This paper has shown that the stylized fact that the yield curve predicts future 
growth holds for the past 125 years, and robustly across several specifications.  The 
monetary regime seems important, and in accord with our theory, regimes with low 
credibility (high persistence) tend to have better predictability.   
  This finding provides important reinforcement for the notion that the monetary 
regime is critical in interpreting the yield curve, and that the term structure of interest 
rates is heavily conditioned on the monetary regime.  In particular, it may be quite 
misleading to draw general conclusions from data generated in one inflation regime. 
  For policymakers, our results suggest that credibility is not always an unmixed 
blessing.  While a more credible regime will usually mean monetary policy is less a 
source of instability for the economy, that very credibility may make policymaking more 
difficult, as information sources such as the yield curve become less informative.   
  It is also possible to turn the results around.  Notions such as credibility are often 
hard to pin down and measure, and our results suggest an additional metric: the predictive 
content of the yield.  This can provide an additional piece of evidence about the 
credibility of the regime in question. 
  The ability of the yield curve to predict the future course of the economy is by 
now well known.  An historical perspective not only confirms the robustness of that 
result, but also sheds insight into the real and financial effects of differing monetary 
regimes. 
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